The Marren and Page Case List Carlson v Carlson

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Pensions fraud

If a prima facie case is made for deviation in either direction, a further step is required, to see if the benefit that would be enjoyed by the deviation-seeking parent and the child is greater than the detriment that would be suffered by the other parent and the child, or the benefit would be less than the detriment, or if the benefit and detriment were equal. A place eligible to be the "home state" is a state within the United States, the District of Columbia, or extensions of our country.5 The UCCJEA also has an international application, as it includes foreign countries as if they were states within the United States, unless the child custody laws of that country violate fundamental principles of human rights.6 Japan is not recognized as such a place, and Japan therefore can, and should be, included within the scope of Nevada¡¯s UCCJEA. Both Nevada and Japan are therefore eligible to be the "home state." Kentucky X In another example, however, the court in Ewing v. Ewing, 21 Va. App. 34, 461 S.E.2d 417 (1995), was called upon to interpret the Virginia guidelines, which provide that a parent has "shared custody" where a parent has custody of the child for at least 110 "days" of the year. In that case, the court determined that "day" should be defined not as overnight visitation, but as any continuous 24-hour period. Accord In re Marriage of Hansen, 81 Wash. App. 494, 914 P.2d 799 (1996) (any period totaling twenty-four continuous hours is "custody", not common-law definition of day, which is midnight to midnight). Ewing and Hansen decisions are flawed, because under the definition of "day" adopted by these courts, it is possible that a non-custodial parent, exercising extensive visitation up to 180 overnights a year, and thus incurring equal cost in child-rearing to the custodial parent, would never have even one full "day" of visitation, leaving the parties with the anomalous and ridiculous result that there are no days in a year. Because the Virginia Child Support Guidelines make an adjustment for shared custody when a parent has 110 "days" of visitation, the Virginia Child Support Guidelines were rendered meaningless as the result of the Ewing decision. Indeed, anecdotal evidence from attorneys in Culpepper County, Virginia, have shown that one judge consistently orders visitation in a way in which neither parent ever has "custody" under the Ewing definition. See Brown v. Brown, VLW 096-8-172 (Va. Cir. Cl. 1996) (by using Ewing definition of day, father was able to eliminate his child support obligation). This case is virtually a primer on what not to do when entering into a premarital agreement, including choosing the attorney for the other party, leaving a party without ample to review the document, interrupting the other party’s appointment with counsel by barging in and yelling "What’s taking so long!" Despite those problems, the district court upheld a premarital agreement as voluntarily and knowingly entered into by both parties. There were two actions. In the first action, the wife sought a divorce. She claimed there was no community property. A divorce was obtained by default. The decree was set aside for fraud. The husband then filed an answer and made his own claim for divorce asking for a division of community property. When the husband filed the amended cross complaint, he alleged that he was married at the time he entered into the marriage ceremony with Ethel M. Wolford, although at that time he thought his wife was dead. The husband alleged that since the marriage, the parties had jointly acquired one lot with a house and household furnishings therein. The husband requested that be awarded an annulment and that he receive one half of the property. The district court granted the annulment and divided the property in half. Neither party asked for a partition of the property. The husband then started a second action requesting a partition of the property. Since both the UCCJEA and UIFSA contain limited immunity clauses, the mere participation by an out-of-State litigant in Nevada custody or support proceedings does not confer jurisdiction on our courts to award fees against the out-of-State party. agreement giving joint legal custody of the child to the parties and primary physical custody to the mother. The father moved to modify January 1992. A hearing was held March 1992. The district court concluded that the father could provide the child better baby-sitting care and a more stable living environment, as well as an extended family. The district court awarded primary physical custody to the father. In April 1992, the mother moved to change custody based upon changed circumstances subsequent to the March hearing. The changed circumstances included, the father appearing at the mother’s home and signing a paper stating that he no longer wanted custody, returning the next morning with the police to regain custody of the child and that the father and his parents systematically harassed and obstructed the mother from seeing the child, that the mother had terminated her relationship with her fiancee so now she could focus her efforts on regaining custody of the child and that the maternal grandmother wanted visitation which would provide the child with extended family. The district court refused the mother’s request. 65279;The first "break in the dam" was the modest "combat-related special compensation" or "CRSC," pay put in the 2003 Defense Authorization Act. It granted an additional payment to two (relatively small)" categories of retirees: those with 20 or more years of service who were receiving disability compensation for which they also received a Purple Heart medal; and those with 20 or more years ofservice who were receiving disability compensation rated at 60% or higher as a result of injuries suffered in combat or "combat-like" training." If a prima facie case is made for deviation in either direction, a further step is required, to see if the benefit that would be enjoyed by the deviation-seeking parent and the child is greater than the detriment that would be suffered by the other parent and the child, or the benefit would be less than the detriment, or if the benefit and detriment were equal. c) In no event shall a parent be required to pay child support under subsection (a) or (b) of this section in an amount greater than the amount that would have been ordered under the support guidelines. The sheer number of post-divorce recharacterization cases involving disability benefits since Mansell1 makes clear the duty of attorneys (and especiallythe attorneys for the spouses) to anticipate post-divorce status changes and build that anticipation into the decrees they write. B> Most States that have brought themselves to issuing any guidelines at all for the distribution of pension plans have espoused rules for the division of the case at issue, without limiting language concerning whether different rules might be better applied if the retirement plan was some other kind of retirement plan. The problem, in a nutshell, is that when a retiree receives a post-divorce disability award, the "disposable" pay already divided between the member and former spouse is decreased, and money that was supposed to be paid to the former spouse is instead redirected to the retiree, no matter what the divorce court ordered. The Court rejected the husband’s attack on Gemma, which he had argued was "fatally flawed" for non-recognition of the "passive appreciation of the sole and separate portion" of the retirement during the marriage. The Court explicitly reaffirmed its holdings in Gemma, Sertic, and Fondi. To illustrate, Joe Sixpack, earning $3,500 per month, has a theoretical child support obligation of 18% of monthly gross income - $630 (for one child). As noted in the 1992 Committee Report, the theoretical child support obligation of 18% is already on the average to low side nationally. But the "presumptive maximum" lowers that sum to $580, even if Joe's income goes up by another 20 percent! On June 26, 1981, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in McCarty v. McCarty,2 holding that federal law preempted a state court from dividing military retired pay, and that federal law identified retired pay as a personal entitlement of the retiree, to which the retiree’s former spouse had no claim. That decision put in motion a series of changes in the law greatly altering the rights and obligations of military members and their spouses, which continue to this day. SUP> The Nevada Supreme Court has not closely analyzed the effects of Braddock on the relative rights of residents of Nevada who, by happenstance of their prior places of residence, could have considerably different rights from other residents vis-a-vis the distribution of identical property interests. A case could be made that any injustice created by selective importation of other States’ laws creates a "compelling reason" basis for a disproportionate property division6 - at least to the extent of restoring to the Nevada resident the effect of a distribution under local law - to prevent forum shopping. a) Determine whether the minority time-share parent is exercising less time than 20% or more time than 40% with the child. If so. proceed to the next step. SUP> A short discussion of what the Hague Convention "is" and "is not" appears to be order. Formally known as The Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, done at the Hague on 25 Oct., 1980, the Hague Convention came into force in the United States through its implementing legislation, the International Child Abduction Remedies Act ("ICARA").2 The Hague Convention is a treaty between the United States and the other signatory countries. Its two objectives are: 1) "to secure prompt return of children wrongfully removed [] or retained"; and, 2) "to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected The USFSPA is both jurisdictional and procedural; it both permits the State courts to distribute military retirement to former spouses, and provides a method for enforcement of these orders through the military pay center. The USFSPA itself does not give former spouses an automatic entitlement to any portion of members’ pay. Only State laws can UP> When the member does have notice, the court may grant the stay anyway if the member requests it. That minimum 90-day stay becomes mandatory if the request includes four items, with no formality requirement:1 There are no "survivorship" benefits, per se, for a TSP account, as it is a cash plan like a 401(k). However, plan participants can and should designate beneficiaries to receive the account balance in the event of the participant’s death.1 In the absence of the form, regular intestate succession rules determine the distribution of the TSP account. Between 1981 and 1989, McCarty, the USFSPA, and Mansell set up the framework within which courts have struggled with issues relating to military retirement benefits and disability benefits, made much more confusing by the retroactive application of each later piece of the structure. B> As documented in an extensive study by the American Bar Associationfs Center on Children and the Law,1 inconsistency of interpretation of the UCCJA and the technicalities of applying the PKPA, resulted in a loss of uniformity among the States. The Obstacles Study suggested a number of amendments which would eliminate the inconsistent state interpretations and harmonize the UCCJA with the PKPA. Amendments to orders are possible, but not if they are issued after the date of retirement or death of the employee and they modify or replace the first order dividing the marital property of the employee or retiree and the former spouse.2 Of course, the issuing court must have had personal jurisdiction over both parties under the law of that State, requiring payments to a former spouse for such support or property. C. Parenting time adjustments are not mandatory, but presumptive. The presumption may be rebutted in a case where the circumstances indicate the adjustment is not in the best interest of the child or that the increased parenting time by the noncustodial parent does not result in greater expenditures which would justify a reduction in the support obligation. The parties had been negotiating a settlement agreement concerning their property, support obligations, and custody. An agreement was reached and the parties signed. The parties then reconciled and then split up again. Following a trial, the parties were divorced. The wife appealed, in part, the district court’s refusal to award attorney’s fees. B> Casas v. Thompson1 was a clear restatement of the law regarding military retirement benefits division as it had evolved in California prior to 1988, which was followed by several other States. It was a partition case ten years after entry of a divorce decree that had not mentioned the retirement. Ultimately, the spouse was granted partition of the omitted retirement from the date she filed her petition, but no arrears. The Court of Appeals affirmed with a few modifications not important here.2 Three long term commercial leases were omitted from the property settlement agreement. Both parties apparently mistakenly believed that the leases had no independent value apart from their value as assets of an ongoing business, when in fact, the optimal value of the leases was as a nuisance for which ITT-Sheraton would be willing to pay $6,450,000. The value of the leases was not considered in the previous dissolution proceedings. Thus, the wife retained an interest in the leases, which were missed assets subject to division as omitted assets. At the same time, the Court eliminated the complicated (and equally uncertain) child support calculation formula in the original Opinion, instead making all such cases fall under the Wright v. Osburn, 114 Nev. 1367, 970 P.2d 1071 (1998), offset method for calculating child support. Instead, it would seem to make more sense to inquire into the economics of the question, and in the absence of some compelling reason to do otherwise, provide the insurable interest security that is the SBP to the spouse with the larger insurable interest to be secured. This serves the interest of securing to each spouse to the original divorce their respective rights to the benefit stream divided upon divorce, unaffected by decisions the other makes, whether to marry, divorce, live, or die.

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